But only weeks after this July 1962 discussion, Moscow and Washington were in a dangerous confrontation over missile deployments in Cuba. The Allies would be on “very unpredictable ground when we have gone this far.”Īn out-of-control Berlin Crisis was what no one wanted to happen, not least Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Suggesting that early nuclear use could be close to a last move, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze pointed to the terrible risks: the “dangers of preemption will multiply” once “nuclear bargaining” had begun. During a discussion of contingency planning published today for the first time, a French diplomat argued that nuclear demonstration shots would send a message to the Soviets without triggering “all-out war.” Doing so “would bring to bear in Moscow the idea that their next move may be their last.” A West German official took a similar position. and its European allies disagreed over whether using nuclear weapons could signal resolve and deter war in a crisis over access to West Berlin. One of them, the Berlin Crisis, vexed two presidents from late 1958 into the early 1960s while it never broke into open conflict with Moscow, it had worrisome potential to turn into a nuclear conflagration. The tensions in East Asia and the Middle East, and elsewhere that led to crises, alerts, and shows of force during the 1950s continued into the 1960s and 1970s. * * * * * Crises, Alerts, and DEFCONS, 1961-1976 – Part II by William Burr The collection begins with the Berlin Crisis of 1961-1962 and concludes with the 1976 confrontation with North Korea over a deadly tree-trimming incident at the Demilitarized Zone. Such military operations amounted to business as usual for a global power with worldwide security and economic interests and a range of alliance commitments. strategic forces were alerted or when strategic bombers and aircraft carrier task forces were used for shows of force. crisis responses during the 1960s and 1970s when U.S. The substance of the July 1962 discussion is one of the revelations in today’s publication, the second of a two-part collection documenting U.S. strategic forces to DEFCON 2, the highest level of force readiness short of a decision to go to war. Just weeks after this discussion, Moscow and Washington found themselves on the verge of a dangerous confrontation over missile deployments in Cuba that brought U.S. The Allies would be on “very unpredictable ground when we have gone this far.” Suggesting that early nuclear use could amount to a last move, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze demurred, pointing to the terrible risks: the “dangers of preemption will multiply” once “nuclear bargaining” had begun. Washington, D.C., Ap– The United States and its European allies disagreed over the advisability of using nuclear weapons to signal resolve and deter war if a serious crisis with Moscow over West Berlin broke out, according to a review of declassified records posted today by the nongovernmental National Security Archive.ĭuring a July 1962 Allied discussion of contingency planning, published today for the first time, a French diplomat argued that nuclear demonstration shots would send a message to the Soviets without triggering “all-out war.” Doing so “would bring to bear in Moscow the idea that their next move may be their last.” A West German official took a similar position.
FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports.
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